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Contested Roles and Domestic Politics:  
Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory  
   
   
   
ABSTRACT  
   
Many of the strengths of research in Foreign Policy Analysis have been overlooked by role 
theorists. Role theorists often assume that roles are shared across elites and masses, that elites 
can manipulate masses, or that public opinion on roles constrains elites.  Role theorists also tend 
to assume that there is a consensus among elites over national roles.  Research in Foreign Policy 
Analysis, on the other hand, demonstrates that foreign policy may be contested both vertically 
(between elites and masses) and horizontally (among elites) and that these conflicts affect foreign 
policy decision making and foreign policy behavior. We propose that: 1) contested roles mean 
that roles and foreign policy are not as stable as is often implied; 2) research on contested roles 
offers Foreign Policy Analysis a less preference-oriented way of conceptualizing policy 
disagreements and decision making; and 3) structures reveal themselves as important when 
agents use them in domestic discourse over contested roles but the impact of international norm 
and role structures is not automatic, as it is shaped by the agents (and domestic structures) in the 
domestic political process.  We suggest that research on the strategic use of roles could bring 
together these benefits of examining contested roles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AUTHORS NOTE:  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ISA-sponsored 
Workshop "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Through Role 
Theory", New Orleans, February 16, 2010.  
   
Interest in role theory and national role conceptions (NRCs) has ebbed and flowed in the 
field of international relations. Holsti (1970), Walker (1987), and Le Prestre (1997), for example, 
have dedicated considerable attention to this topic in the last three decades. Generally speaking, 
NRCs include “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state 
should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional 
systems” (Holsti 1970, 246). For example, a state that defines one of its roles as a “balancer” 
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(Holsti 1970, 255) is expected, among other things, to seek to balance between blocs of power in 
order to preserve autonomy. Even though it has mostly been foreign policy analysis scholars who 
have used role theory, this literature has developed largely without much interaction with other 
research in foreign policy analysis (FPA). Most importantly, role theorists have often made a 
series of assumptions about the existence of consensus surrounding roles without providing clear 
evidence in this regard and without investigating the potential presence of role contestation.   
The current paper urges a dialogue between role theory and research on domestic sources 
of foreign policy. We argue that some weaknesses in role theory can be addressed by the 
strengths of FPA, and vice versa.  The strengths of FPA are, at best, overlooked by role theory 
research and, at worst, what we know about how domestic politics influences foreign policy is 
inconsistent with assumptions in much of the role theory literature.  FPA can provide insights on 
the mass-elite nexus and intra-elite conflicts, which can often include disagreements about roles. 
FPA theories can use the NRC literature as a way to include ideas and identity in their analysis of 
foreign policy-making. Together, foreign policy analysts and role theorists can better address 
agent-structure relationships. 
We do not argue that the integration of FPA insights into role theory will always be 
fruitful. There may be many cases in which scholars will discover that NRCs are not, in fact, 
contested by either elites or by masses. What we do take issue with is the assumption that such 
consensus exists in every case without the provision of strong evidence in this regard. FPA has 
had a long tradition of challenging assumptions of domestic consensus with regards to foreign 
policy, and role theory would be strengthened by engaging with this literature in greater depth. 
We proceed as follows. First, we describe the NRC approach and the theoretical gaps in 
the literature. Our focus will be on the overlooked interaction between masses and elites and 
intra-elite conflicts in the foreign policy realm. Second, we argue that FPA can fill these gaps, to 
the mutual benefit of both the foreign policy literature and role theory.  
 
ASSUMPTIONS AND GAPS IN ROLE THEORY LITERATURE 
Privileging Elites, Overlooking the Masses 
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Role theory initially developed in sociology and psychology to understand the behavior 
of individuals (Le Prestre 1997; Biddle and Thomas 1966; Grossman 2005). Scholars who have 
extended this approach to understand a state's “national role conceptions” (NRCs) have had to 
deal with and justify the wisdom of such aggregation (Holsti 1970; Adigbuo 2007). Usually, 
researchers have chosen to resolve this problem by investigating the NRCs of foreign policy 
elites (e.g. Korany 2005). This begs the question of why foreign policy elites can stand for the 
entire country with regard to its role conceptions. Two explanations have been put forth in extant 
literature.  
              First, role conceptions are argued to have a social origin or are “social phenomena” and 
can, as a result, be shared “even among most of the individuals within a state” (Chafetz et al. 
1996, 733; see also Krotz 2001).1 This assumption is logical given assertions that the sources of 
roles are, among other things, a nation's history, culture, and social characteristics (Aggestam 
2006).  In addition, role theorists justify their use of elite NRCs by asserting that roles are 
intersubjective and are, therefore, shared in society at large. This contention remains mostly 
unsubstantiated in their work, however. There is little use of polling data and other measures that 
would tap into whether the masses really do agree with the elites on a country’s national roles.  
               A second explanation for why elite NRCs can serve as an indicator of a nation's role 
conceptions is that even if these are not shared at the national level, foreign policy elites are the 
ones who make decisions about how a country should behave internationally. In addition, these 
elites will supposedly behave based on their idea of what would be acceptable to the people 
(Chafetz et al. 1996; Adigbuo 2007). One indication of what “acceptable” means can be parsed 
out in Chafetz et al.'s argument that public opinion polls reflect the degree of congruence 
between the foreign policy belief of the masses versus the belief of leaders. This argument 
suggests that public opinion does matter, at the very least as a constraint on the construction of 
NRCs, and begs the question of what happens when public opinion or society at large contests or 
disagrees with the role conceptions promoted by elites. In any case, the recognition of the 
potential importance of public opinion is not accompanied by serious consideration of this 
                                                 
1 Aggestam notes that “role conceptions have a social origin and that the state is the role-beholder” (1999, 10). The 
author adds that foreign policy-makers are used in her article as “collectively representing the state as a social actor 
in foreign policy” (1999, 10). 
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variable or of the masses in general.  
              These assumptions and arguments have had an important consequence in the NRC 
literature: the focus on elite NRCs has left the elite-masses nexus underexplored and 
undertheorized in role theory. Since Holsti's (1970) formulation, this literature has focused on the 
effects NRCs have on state foreign policy behavior. That is, NRCs have been utilized as 
independent variables to explain foreign policy decisions (Breuning 1995; Catalinac 2007; 
Grossman 2005; Walker 1987). This approach could only be possible if scholars assumed the 
existence of a set of roles, measured these, and then analyzed their impact.  
 The analysis of roles essentially stops at the definition of a number of these for a country, 
usually during a particular period. Two issues receive very little attention after this point. First, it 
is unclear how much opposition there is in society with regards to a particular role. For example, 
Thibault and Levesque (1997) find that between 1992 and 1993, speeches of Russian leaders 
expressed the role of “integrator of Russia into the Western world” 17 percent out of the total 
percentage of roles expressed during that period. The question is whether this role generated any 
opposition. How much contestation with regards to this role existed in 1992 and 1993? Did 
anyone propose or support an alternative role that would be very opposite of integration into the 
West? What does an alternative role look like?  Secondly, role theorists generally do not 
define the inner and outer bounds of the role, which would allow them to identify the nature and 
degree of role contestation. That is, was agreement or disagreement about Russia’s role as 
“integrator into the Western world” related to the legitimacy or the role itself, or to its 
implementation? How are the two different from each other, and when does contestation of the 
means with which to implement a role become contestation about the legitimacy of the role 
itself? These questions are largely left unanswered in the literature. This weakness, however, is 
not insurmountable. In fact, FPA has provided both empirical and theoretical tools with which 
these questions can be answered, particularly when it comes to investigations of mass-elite 
interactions in the context of NRC construction and expression 
              There are, of course, some exceptions to this relative inattention to public opinion and to 
the masses in general with regards to role contestation. Some authors acknowledge the fact that 
the public at large and opinion-makers have an impact on role formulation, but do not go beyond 
this insight, preferring to focus on foreign policy elites (Grossman 2005; Macleod 1997; Prys 
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2008). Others suggest that subnational units -- like Länders in Germany -- could have an impact 
on the expression of national roles (Harnisch and Maull 2001). Some talk about attempts by 
leaders to mould (Letourneau and Rakel 1997), mobilize (Thumerelle and Le Prestre 1997), or 
manipulate public opinion to “sell” actions scripts (Rosenau 1990, 219). There are even some 
hints about possible disagreement between elites and citizens regarding a country's role 
(Letourneau and Rakel 1997). Many of these statements, however, are marginal to the primary 
concern with elite NRCs.  
              Authors who have thought more systematically about this issue include Catalinac 
(2007), who speaks about the possible influence and relevance of public opinion in the Japanese 
government's policy toward the two Gulf Wars (although the author argues that public opinion 
did not account for the difference in Japan's policy between 1991 and 2003) (Catalinac 2007). 
Lucarelli also uses public opinion polls and European Union documents to establish the 
European Union's self-images (2006). For Holsti (1987), public opinion and personality are 
sources of national role conceptions. He notes that leaders defining new national roles for a 
country will have a hard time doing so if public opinion is not sufficiently flexible or if there is 
insufficient public support). Evans argues that this is why the foreign policies of authoritarian 
regimes cannot be understood with the help of roles because dictators are not worried about 
consistent behavior that would normally be required by public opinion (Evans 2001). The 
problem with this assumption is that the little research on public opinion in authoritarian systems 
suggests that public opinion can indeed matter (e.g., Telhami 1993). Even some role theory 
scholars have recognized the fact that the assertion of roles by leaders could be used to gain 
legitimacy in both democracies and non-democracies, which is illustrative of the fact that 
popular opinion in dictatorships does, in fact, have some influence (Smart 1995). In general, it is 
safe to say that the focus on elite NRCs has limited both the exploration of the acceptance of 
these roles in the society at large and the analysis of the masses-elites nexus. FPA, in contrast, 
provides a bulk of theoretical and empirical support for exactly these two gaps in the NRC 
literature.  
 
Black-boxing Elites, Assuming Consensus  
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              Aside from the focus on elites, NRC scholars often underplay or ignore the contestation 
of roles within the elite group. “Elites” are normally defined as a unit and are essentially black-
boxed. We often do not get to see the actual identity of the elite member who made a certain 
statement which was later used to code a particular national role conception (e.g. Macleod 2004).  
As a result, the notion of national role conceptions suggests some degree of unity and agreement 
among elites in a country regarding NRCs when such agreement may not, in fact, exist.2 Some 
authors even see black-boxing elites as an advantage, as it is more parsimonious.3  
One of the main reasons why NRC scholars typically ignore role contestations by elites 
lies in their approach to measurement. Statements of individual elites are aggregated and 
averaged to form a collection of NRCs a country holds.4 This aggregated collection is then used 
for correlations with foreign policy behaviors. The identities of the people whose speeches and 
words are used to aggregate NRCs usually become obscured. That is, if an author uses speeches 
by the Japanese Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Parliamentary Vice-Minister (Macleod 
1997), we do not get summaries of the role conceptions according to each of these actors, but 
distributions of NRCs which were collected from all of them.5  
Even when researchers identify multiple roles for a country, they aggregate these in the 
form of  a distribution of roles, assumed to be held by the entire elite group, rather than assigning 
different roles to different individuals or subgroups. Catalinac (2007), for example, compiles a 
list of about 500 role statements expressed by foreign policy elites during the two Gulf Wars in 
Japan, aggregates them into distributions (three main roles are identified), and then says that a 
                                                 
2 There are some, like Holsti (1970), who look at the number of NRCs expressed in each source – one source like a 
leader's speech, for example, will mention a number of roles. This particular approach is not problematic insofar as it 
recognizes that even single leaders do not have one notion of their country's behavior abroad. 
3 Macleod (2004) notes that “I have decided to stick to them [to using speeches from national leaders] not just 
because official declarations are easily accessible but also because they are usually the outcome of a collective 
process, involving power struggles, policy disagreements and partisan infighting” (Macleod 2004, 364). Others, like 
Ingebritsen, aggregate countries and refer to regions, Scandinavia in this case, as having similar roles in the world.  
4 Or just one national role conception – see Krotz (2001). Others, like Venneson et al. (2009), look at the role 
conceptions of bureaucracies, like the military. Within the role theory literature, there seems to be a division between 
authors who use individual statements and national-level statements (such as foreign policy documents issued by a 
relevant ministry. So there is some degree of disagreement over whether role conceptions can be parsed out from 
those expressed by individuals or by institutions. We do not address this internal disagreement because our critique 
is applicable to the literature as a whole no matter at what level the role is defined.  
5 There are some exceptions.  Breuning does investigate whether a minister's political affiliation matters in the relative 
emphasis of NRCs in overall debates and ministers' statements. Evans (2001) mentions the role of particular 
Japanese Prime Ministers in the expression NRCs. 
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change in the distribution of these roles is correlated with Japan's difference in approaches during 
the two wars. There is relatively little indication of what exactly accounts for this change and 
what the identities of these elites were during every debate.6  Chafetz et al. (1996, 774) also 
aggregate NRCs from Ukraine and Belarus, and then compare percentages of role conceptions 
articulated in both countries.7 They then argue that “role theory can explain and predict the 
proliferation behavior of other states” (748). What is unclear with this practice is whether one 
NRC, for example, which was expressed in 40 percent of the references in the data used during a 
particular period of time was the result of a particularly persistent elite member or was shared 
throughout the elite group.8  While FPA tends to emphasize the significance of foreign policy 
disagreement among elites, NRC theorists de-emphasize these by aggregation. But it seems 
important to know, for example, whether Foreign Ministers express different role conceptions 
than their respective Prime Ministers.9 This is all the more important in coalition governments, 
where foreign policy-making actors may, in fact, have wholly different role conceptions which 
will be hidden by aggregation. The NRC literature can therefore lose considerable empirical 
information in the process of creating a general measure of NRCs. We are not arguing, of course, 
that the investigation of such disagreements will always reveal disagreements about roles. FPA 
literature has shown, however, that it is a mistake to assume foreign policy consensus. 
Consequently, the analysis of role contestation is inherently valuable because it will either 
provide evidence for the assumption of role consensus or reveal contestation. In either case, the 
role theory literature will be stronger from a theoretical and empirical standpoint than it is now.  
                                                 
6 Ironically, although many role theorists recognize the importance of leaders and elites in foreign policy-making 
because they study their speeches, they aggregate their statements into proportions of roles expressed and therefore 
efface the identity of these elites. In short, NRC theorists use individual-level information to create aggregate 
measures. Foreign policy analysis has, on the contrary, attempted to investigate whether individuals and groups can 
be conceptualized in foreign policy-making. 
7 The authors do mention that a change in the relative weight of the expression of NRCs could be explained by 
changes in leadership (Chafetz et al. 1996, 747). 
8 For example, Breuning (1995) uses parliamentary debates, codes them, and then identifies how often a particular 
role is expressed. She finds that in the Netherlands, the activist role conception is expressed 43.4 percent of the time. 
Breuning does investigate whether a minister's political affiliation matters in the relative emphasis of NRCs in 
overall debates and ministers' statements. Evans (2001) mentions the role of particular Japanese Prime Ministers in 
the expression NRCs. 
9 This is not, of course, possible to do when the data being used is based on speeches from one leader and one leader 
only (Thumerelle and Le Prestre 1997, 142). Also see Macleod (1997, 172) for an exception to this approach in the 
literature. 
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Statements made by elites are also aggregated across time.10 This is usually done to allow 
the analysis of changes in NRC distributions. The problem is that  the particular unit of 
aggregation (often a year) is rather arbitrary and may obscure possible temporal differences in 
the expression of types of national roles during particular weeks and months. In addition, the fact 
that we are not familiar with the identity of the people making the statements does not allow us 
to investigate if changes in NRC distributions are due to particular leaders or subgroups.11  
Importantly, depending on the data being used, temporal aggregations do not permit analyses of 
how contested or debated NRCs were during a specific period.  
              It is unclear, for example, whether the distribution of role conceptions in Japan in 
Catalinac’s study between February 1 and July 30, 2003 changed during this period.12 The 
situation at this time – the run-up to the Iraq war – was extremely dynamic, and there is a 
possibility that NRCs were in flux; there might have also been quite a lot of disagreement about 
these roles, but the aggregation obscures evidence of any debates. Evans (2001), for example, 
indicates four time periods (1964-1967; 1980-1982; 1986-1987; and 1990-1991) with 
distributions of roles, but there is little indication of fluctuations in roles within these periods. 
For the period between 1990 and 1991, Evans gathers the number of times certain roles were 
expressed, and then provides a list. For example, the “developer” role was expressed eight times 
during these two years, while the “faithful ally” role appeared nine times. There is no dynamic 
timeline for when these roles were expressed in 1990-1991 and whether there were any 
significant fluctuations. For example, perhaps the “developer” role was mostly expressed in 1990 
and the “faithful ally” role was expressed mostly in 1991. Would such a finding be significant or 
matter for foreign policy-making during these two years? Grossman (2005) and most of the 
chapters in Le Prestre (1997) provide yearly aggregations of NRCs, with little indication of 
either monthly variations or of the actual nature and dynamic of NRC expression during every 
year.  
              Few NRC scholars have recognized that there could be some disagreement about roles 
in a country. Holsti (1970), for example, provided a table of incompatible national roles (Holsti 
                                                 
10Holsti (1970) picks 1965-1967, for example. 
11 Some authors (in Le Prestre 1997; Chafetz et al. 1996) do note that changes in the aggregate weight of NRCs may 
be associated with changes in leadership, but these statements are once again made while using aggregate measures. 
12 Catalinac (2007) does not address this. 
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1970, 302). He noted, however, that although some NRCs may appear incompatible, they may 
actually be orientations toward different sets of relationships.  
              Aggestam  dealt directly with role conflict, arguing that one of the most visible stimuli 
for change is the appearance of role conflict and an actor's experience of it (Aggestam 2006, 23). 
Conflict appears “when dominant role conceptions in the role-set are incompatible with one 
another.” (Aggestam 2006, 23). According to Aggestam, there are several reasons why role 
conflicts could appear. First, a role set includes many roles, “several of which are generated from 
different institutional contexts, both domestic and international.” (Aggestam 2006, 23). Second, 
role conflict will appear “when the conditions and context within which they were originally 
formulated change.” (Aggestam 2006, 23). Others have acknowledged that role conflict can lead 
to foreign policy dysfunctions (Le Prestre 1997). Although Tewes (2004) and Barnett (1993) 
look at this subject more in-depth, this topic would benefit from engaging more directly with the 
foreign policy literature, which would not only be helpful in explaining how groups might deal 
with role conflict, but how individual decision-makers have to struggle with inconsistent or 
contradictory notions of how they should behave.  In short, the NRC literature is weak on the 
elite-masses nexus and on intra-elite conflicts regarding a country's foreign policy. It is precisely 
on these two topics that other research in FPA can offer insights.  
   
FPA CHALLENGES TO ASSUMPTIONS AND GAPS 
IN ROLE THEORY LITERATURE  
 
Vertically-Contested Roles  
Research in FPA suggests that elites and masses may disagree on their country’s proper 
roles in the international system.  Indeed, there is often a disconnect between leaders’ and the 
public’s views on a number of specific issues, as well as more general foreign policy 
orientations, such as national role conceptions.  According to Page and Barabas, for example, 
“the most conspicuous gap between citizens and leaders [in the United States] is a familiar and 
long-standing one:  more leaders than citizens tend to be ‘internationalists’ at least in the simple 
sense that they say they favor the United States taking an ‘active’ part in world affairs” (Page and 
Barabas 2000:344; see also Page and Bouton 2006).  Similarly, Risse and his colleagues argue 
that elite and mass attitudes toward the Euro differed over a long period, partly due to different 
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conceptions of German identity (Risse et al. 1999:177).  Gaps between elite and mass foreign 
policy attitudes in France also tend to be significant (Risse-Kappen 1991:504) and Arab public 
opinion is typically more radical than elite views on countries' roles in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Telhami 1993:438). A more radical view may, in fact, point to mass conceptions that oppose the 
role of “balancing” Israel against Iran that elites may express,.   
If disagreements between elites and the public exist over foreign policy roles, the 
relationship between the public’s views and elite choices is far from straight-forward.  The 
previous consensus (consistent with Realism) that foreign policy elites are unconstrained by an 
apathetic, uninformed public with unstable views has been challenged by a number of studies, 
particularly after the Vietnam War (Holsti 2002). Shifts in foreign policy public opinion, for 
example, may not stem from instability and indicate volatility, but can be quite predictable and 
“rational” in the sense that they are responsive to external cues (e.g., Mueller 1973; Page and 
Shapiro 1992).  While there is little evidence that the public has a high level of factual 
information about foreign policy, studies have shown that the public’s views are structured by 
underlying core values or orientations (e.g., Wittkopf, 1987; Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson 
1993; Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004).  These orientations, such as internationalism 
or pacifism, certainly relate to public notions of national roles.  
How much public opinion actually influences foreign policy is still unanswered in foreign 
policy research.  We know that foreign policy issues are more important in voting behavior than 
was previously assumed (e.g., Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989), that foreign policy issues 
matter for evaluations of leaders’ performance, and that public opinion and foreign policy are 
significantly correlated (see Holsti 2002 for a review).  Case study research has also 
demonstrated that in many decisions, leaders are both attentive and responsive to public opinion 
(e.g., Foyle 1997; Graber 1968; Sobel 2001).  In addition, the institutional explanation in 
democratic peace research is consistent with the idea that leaders are constrained by the public.  
While this research in FPA does offer some support for the assumption in role theory that 
a culturally-based national role conception at the mass level can influence foreign policy via 
elites, other research challenges this. Case study research shows that in many other decisions, 
leaders ignored or defied public opinion, even under democratic institutions (e.g., Fischer 1997; 
Hildebrand 1981; Elman 1997).  And recent studies have focused on the success of leaders to 
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manipulate public opinion to support their preferences (e.g., Foyle 2004; Shapiro and Jacobs 
2000; Rathbun 2004).  Media and framing influences on public opinion also challenge the notion 
that mass views are a stable and independent source of foreign policy (e.g., Entman 2004; Kull, 
Ramsay, and Lewis 2003-2004; Boettcher and Cobb 2006).  
Research on the influence of public opinion on foreign policy has turned toward 
investigations of intervening conditions that affect this relationship.  Foyle, for example, argues 
that leaders’ beliefs about the appropriateness and necessity of considering public opinion affect 
the role that the public will play in foreign policy decisions (Foyle 1997; see also Dyson 2006).  
Others suggest the type of issue and the stage of decision making are important conditions in the 
mass-elite linkage (e.g., Knect and Weatherford 2006).  Risse-Kappen (1991) proposed that 
domestic political structures play a key intervening role and democratic peace research has 
moved toward teasing out the effects that different democratic institutions have on conflict 
behavior (e.g., Elman 2000; Ireland and Gartner 2001; Leblang and Chan 2003; Palmer, London, 
and Regan 2004).  
Overall, research in FPA points to the notion that elites and masses may disagree over the 
state’s proper roles.  The relationship is complicated; public opinion is not an automatic 
constraint on leaders (and leaders can manipulate public opinion).  Yet public opinion on roles 
may matter for some states, for some leaders, at some times. Role theory could benefit from 
engaging with this literature because FPA has increasingly found that elites are not insulated 
from the masses in foreign policy-making. This is bound to affect both the influence of roles on 
foreign policy and the ability of elites to act on them.  
  
Horizontally-Contested Roles  
Much of the research in FPA demonstrates that there is often considerable disagreement 
among domestic political elites over foreign policy.  Although this research has not focused 
specifically on disagreement over roles, it has much to say about the way in which conflicts over 
foreign policy affect both the policymaking process and resulting foreign policy behavior.  This 
research has concentrated on conflicts between governing elites and political opposition (both 
institutionalized and informal), within governing coalitions, in small decision making and 
advisory groups, and across bureaucratic agencies.   
12 
 
Foreign Policy Conflict between Governing Elites and Political Opposition 
Research on the role and effects of non-institutionalized domestic political opposition in 
foreign policy has focused on non-democratic, weak states and how leaders use foreign policy to 
divert attention away from internal conflicts and/or enhance their legitimacy.   Rather than 
accepting the conventional wisdom that non-democratic leaders can ignore internal opposition, 
foreign policy analysts have argued that because of the lack of popular legitimacy or the 
historical origin of many non-democratic states, foreign policy can be central to political power 
dynamics in authoritarian systems (Lawson 1984; Dawisha 1990; Hagan 1993; Hagan 2001).  
According to Telhami, for example, Arab states’ legitimacy has historically been tied to 
transnational issues and regional influence.  In particular, “…the Palestinian issue remains at the 
core of every major Arab, Islamic, and anti-western political movement….Its history is closely 
linked to the inception of Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism, and all those defining moments of 
Arab relations with the rest of the world….Arab governments have always understood that the 
regional influence that affects their legitimacy depends on the degree to which they offer 
advantages on the question of Palestine..." (Telhami 1993:441).  
Research on the foreign policy effects from institutionalized political opposition has 
concentrated on democratic states and the influence of legislatures as institutional actors.  The 
U.S. Congress is generally regarded as having more influence than most other democratic 
legislatures.  Although it often defers to, or is ignored by, the U.S. President, Congress can have 
influence through legislation, resolutions, oversight, and public appeals (Howell and Pevehouse 
2007; Johnson 2006).  Conflict between Congress and the President can be rooted in NRCs with 
Congress, for example, defending a more isolated role for the United States in the international 
economy and the president advocating a more internationalist role (Mayhew 2009, 260; De Vault 
2002, 10; but see Nzelibe 2005, 1269). Inter-institutional disagreements about such roles as 
hegemon, balancer, tribune and agent of American values, and isolate (LePrestre 1997)certainly 
exist in the Unites States government, and their analysis is inherently important for a broader 
understanding of role consensus or disagreement.  
In parliamentary democracies, the conventional wisdom on national assemblies as 
institutional actors in foreign policy is that they are generally very weak, especially if a single 
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party has a majority in parliament and exclusive representation in the cabinet (see Kesgin and 
Kaarbo, 2010 for a review).  Still, foreign policy powers of parliaments vary widely (Pahre 1997; 
Martin 2001; Born 2004; Dietrich, Hummel, and Marschall 2008) and some yield considerable 
oversight and ratification authority.  In Denmark, for example, treaties require a five-sixth 
parliamentary approval, giving parliamentary opposition a clear role in major foreign policy 
decisions (Martin 2001).  Dietrich, Hummel, and Marschall (2008) specifically examine EU 
national parliaments in the 2003 Iraq war, comparing levels of legislative and budgetary powers, 
control and communication powers, and election and dismissal powers of parliaments in foreign 
affairs.  For all twenty-five EU countries, they categorize parliamentary war powers as deficient, 
basic, deferred, selective, or comprehensive.  Surprisingly, eleven of the national parliaments 
were classified as having comprehensive war powers, meaning that prior parliamentary approval 
is required for every governmental decision relating to the use of force and parliament can 
investigate and debate the use of military force. They then examine the level of involvement by 
each country in the Iraq war and found that while there was a general relationship (greater 
parliamentary war powers was associated with less involvement), there were important 
exceptions.  
Similarly Wolfgang Wagner’s (2006) study examines democratic accountability in the EU 
by comparing parliamentary powers of member states.  He argues that “…the consent of 
parliament prior to any deployment of troops has been required in Germany, Austria, Denmark, 
Sweden, Ireland, and many of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.  In 
Hungary, even two-thirds of the Members of Parliament must vote in favour of a deployment. In 
Italy and the Netherlands, governments have regarded parliamentary approval as indispensable 
although there has been no constitutional requirement to do so.  However, in some of these 
countries, the deployment law provides for exceptions from and modifications of the general rule 
of parliamentary approval” (Wagner, 2006:204-5). The research on variation in the formal 
powers of parliaments typically notes that legal provisions are only part of the picture.  
According to Hänggi (2004), for example, “the relevance of these powers, just like all powers of 
parliaments, is contingent on the resources and expertise at the disposal of parliaments and, last 
but not least, on the political will of the parliamentarians to hold government accountable for the 
use of force…” (Hänggi, 2004:15).  
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Parliaments allow for representation of a wide range of viewpoints and thus may be a 
forum for discourse on and conflict over national role conceptions.  This conflict can occur 
withing parties holding a majority of seats and between the majority and opposition parties in 
parliamentary systems.  Indeed, role conceptions may stem from party ideology and be 
institutionalized in electoral platforms.  Although there is little research on partisanship and 
political ideology in foreign policy, Rathbun (2004) makes a strong argument that partisanship 
and political parties matter in state policies on humanitarian interventions. According to Rathbun 
(2004:8), “…parties articulate and implement very different policies in the areas of humanitarian 
intervention and European defense cooperation due to their different ideological fundamentals.  
This proposition calls into question the assumption of consistent national approaches to 
international affairs that has long been the dominant tradition in the policy literature.” Rathbun 
argues that there is little synthesis between those international relations theorists who focus on 
ideas and those who focus on domestic politics and domestic political institutions.  For Rathbun, 
political parties bring “ideas through the front door” (2004:7; see also Schuster and Maier 2006 
and Therien and Noel 2000).13  
 For example, political parties in the post-Soviet world have frequently been divided over 
the roles their countries should play after independence. Some parties have voiced the desire to 
act as “active independents” (see Holsti 1970) by refusing to align with the West or with Russia, 
while others have frequently expressed opinions that suggest the role of “protectee” of the West 
(see Holsti 1970). Ukraine and Georgia would be good examples in this context (Kuzio 2005; 
Benn 2010). 
 
Foreign Policy Conflict in Multiparty Coalitions 
In some parliamentary democracies, role conflict that is institutionalized in political 
parties may surface in the cabinet – the primary body for making foreign policy decisions – if the 
cabinet is a multiparty coalition. Coalition cabinets, in which two or more parties share decision 
making authority, are the dominant form of governance in European parliamentary systems and 
                                                 
13 Breuning (1995) is one of the few role theorists who takes an in-depth look at whether political affiliation 
matters.  Some of the chapters in Le Prestre (1997), like Macleod's, also note some inter- and intra-party debates on 
roles. 
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are often found in other states, such as Japan and India. The shared authority in the cabinet can 
be particularly important for foreign policy as the key posts in the cabinet are often split across 
party lines.  Indeed, next to the prime minister, the positions of foreign and defense minister are 
the “prize” ministries that parties seek to control and in many cases, the posts of foreign and/or 
defense minister are controlled by a party that is different from the party that controls the prime 
ministership.  
Although coalition partners do not always disagree over foreign policy, they frequently 
do, and these disagreements may be rooted in different national role conceptions. Binnur 
Ozkececi-Taner (2005) argues that political parties are a primary medium for the expression of 
ideas, that the impact of ideas is most visible when there is political discord, and that 
“…coalition governments present a potential venue for analyzing and operationalizing how the 
‘battle of ideas’ at the decision-making level are influential in affecting foreign policy” 
(2005:250). Her research tracks ideational and ideological conflict among Turkish cabinet 
coalition partners and finds that different conceptions of Turkey’s role (e.g., nationalist, 
Kemalist, and internationalist) are indeed institutionalized in political parties and these 
discordant ideas have been an important source of Turkish foreign policy.  
When coalition partners disagree over foreign policy, research suggests that coalition 
politics can affect decision making and foreign policy, although there are competing expectations 
of the nature of those effects.  Consistent with the logic of the democratic peace, for example, 
there is evidence that the multiple voices in a coalition cabinet constrain a government from 
aggressive policy (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Reiter and Tillman 2002).  On the other hand, some 
studies have found coalitions to be more aggressive, perhaps because they allow for small, 
ideologically extreme parties to blackmail and hijack cabinets that their support to stay in power 
(Prins and Sprecher 1999, Palmer, Regan, and London 2004).14 In their analysis of event data, 
Kaarbo and Beasley (2008) found that multiparty cabinets tend to choose more “extreme” 
foreign policy (both more cooperative and more conflictual) than do single party cabinets.  
Kaarbo’s case study research on Germany, Israeli, Dutch, Turkish, and Japanese foreign policies 
                                                 
14 For a review of the theoretical arguments underlying these expectations, see Kaarbo and Beasley (2008), Kaarbo 
(2008), and Kaarbo (2009).  There are also competing expectations about the effects of coalition politics on the 
quality of foreign policy decision making.  For a review, see Kaarbo (2008).  
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has found that the effect of coalition politics on foreign policy is contingent on a number of 
factors, including leadership style and the nature of the issue (Kaarbo 1996; Kaarbo 2009).   
These cases also demonstrate that policy conflicts between coalition partners can 
certainly be related to more general conflicts over national role conceptions.  In Turkey in the 
mid-1990s, for example, the cabinet included the Welfare Party, an Islamist party, and the True 
Path Party, each preferring quite different roles for Turkey.  While True Path embraced a more 
traditional, Western-looking role, Welfare promoted Turkey as a leader of the Islamic world.  As 
a result, Turkish foreign policy resembled “… a car with two drivers, each trying to steer it in 
opposite directions” (Hale 2000: 239). In Japan in the late 1990s, debates over Japanese 
participation in multilateral peacekeeping and strategies to secure a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council involved competing roles of Japan as a "small country" versus Japan as 
a more “normal power” (Mochizuki, 1995, but see Miyagi 2009). These competing roles were 
represented in multiparty cabinets and paralyzed Japanese efforts in this policy area. More 
recently, the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats may certainly reveal 
a number of disagreements on the United Kingdom’s roles, such as its status as “faithful ally” 
(see Holsti 1970) to the U.S. or as “regional collaborator” (see Macleod 1997).  
 
Foreign Policy Conflict in Small Groups 
The small group perspective in FPA argues that most foreign policy decisions are made 
by a small group of decision makers or by a leader with a small group of advisors and that there 
are certain dynamics unique to small group decision making that may significantly impact 
foreign policy choices (‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997; Garrison 2003).  Much of the research 
on small groups is about how conflict is managed.  Even groupthink, which focuses on the 
dangers of too much consensus in small groups, includes dynamics for the suppression of 
conflict (i.e., mind-guarding and self-censorship) (Janis 1972; ‘t Hart 1994).  From this research, 
we know that small groups are particularly susceptible to two decision making pathologies:  too 
much conflict that leads to paralysis, deadlock, and meaningless compromises and too little 
conflict that leads to unquestioned assumptions, a lack of contingency planning, and premature 
closure on policy options (Hermann 1993; Hermann et al. 2001).  We also know that leaders’ 
position and decision making styles have a significant impact on how conflicting ideas are 
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managed (or not) in small groups (Kowert 2002; Peterson 1997; Verbeek 2003) and that there are 
certain conditions that allow minority viewpoints to challenge prevailing, majority positions 
(Maoz 1990; Levine and Kaarbo 2001; Kaarbo 2008).  
While small group research has typically focused on the presence or absence of conflict 
over policy preferences, preference disagreement may indeed stem from different national role 
conceptions held by group members.  Indeed, the literature on problem representations suggests 
that more general disagreements drive small group decision making (Voss 1991; Sylvan and 
Thorson, 1992; Beasley 1998).  In other words, preferences fall from basic understandings of the 
problem. A representation of Hitler’s demands at Munich, for example, as simply annexation for 
national integration would lead to a set of policy options that were incompatible with options 
stemming from a representation of the situation as a first step in German aspirations for 
domination.  Similarly, incompatible policy preferences may fall from alternative NRCs.  If this 
is the case, then a focus on conflict over roles in a small group may be particularly important for 
examining horizontal role conflict.  
 
Foreign Policy Conflict Across Bureaucratic Agencies 
Research on bureaucratic conflict over foreign policy has also largely focused on 
preference disagreement, but role conflict may also underlie inter-agency “pulling and hauling” 
as well.  Indeed, although preference disagreements may stem from different organizational 
missions and political and personal incentives, they may also be rooted in different worldviews 
which may include different national role conceptions.  If roles are contested along bureaucratic 
lines, research on bureaucratic politics tells us that we can expect a number of problems, 
including poor interagency communication and coordination and resultant outcomes (Allison 
1971; Stern and Verbeek 1998).  Drezner’s research on how idea-infused agencies survive and 
thrive in bureaucratic struggles also shows how “missionary” agencies can change bureaucratic 
routines and practices to spread their ideas throughout the organization (Drezner 2000:746).  
Since some research on bureaucratic roles has already wrestled with the problems of role 
determinacy and role conflict (e.g., Hollis and Smith 1986; Ripley 1995), how national role 
conceptions relate to bureaucratic roles may be a particularly fruitful avenue for research. Some 
authors have already begun looking at this topic. Venneson et al. (2009) look at the national role 
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conceptions of militaries and make a strong case that bureaucracies do not necessarily hold 
compatible national role conceptions. In addition, the investigation of roles in bureaucratic 
organizations makes sense given that one of the ways role theory initially entered political 
science and foreign policy analysis in particular was via the “bureaucratic politics” research 
program (Jonsson and Westerlund 1982). Afterwards, attention turned toward aggregating the 
role expressed by national elites. A return to individual decision-makers and bureaucracies would 
be fruitful.  
   
INTEGRATING CONTESTED ROLES INTO ROLE THEORY ANALYSIS: 
BENEFITS FOR ROLE THEORY, FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND IR THEORY 
 
What can attention to contested roles contribute to the study of foreign policy, role theory, 
and IR theory?  In this section, we offer four ways in which a better understanding of role 
conflict can directly benefit these areas of scholarship: 
  Contested roles may mean that roles are not as stable as is implied by the assumptions 
in role theory research; attention to contested roles would allow role theorists to explain 
changes and inconsistencies in roles and foreign policy behavior, no matter how quickly or 
slowly they may change.  If NRCs are not shared, then different political actors may follow 
different foreign policies simultaneously or foreign policy may change over time due to changes 
in the dominant political actors or the internal power balance in the country.  Some role theorists 
do see changes in the expression of NRCs.  Thumerelle and Le Prestre (1997), for example, 
found that the French role of promoting peace and stability is expressed in 13.9 percent of the 
speeches investigated in 1989 and 8.2 percent of them in 1990, yet they do not account for this 
variation. Does this mean that the role was on the wane? Does it mean that more leaders 
expressed its opposite instead?Domestic politics could certainly be an explanatory factor and a 
helpful tool with which to answer these questions. Unfortunately, role theorists have done little 
work on this topic.  
As mentioned earlier, changes in public opinion, rulers, and institutions could have a 
significant impact on the expression of a country’s national role conceptions. Without taking 
these elements into consideration, role theorists black-box the state and/or “elites” as a group  
The fact that a leader or a set of elites express a number of multiple roles may not necessarily 
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mean that they endorse multiple roles as a collectivity. Different actors may consistently behave 
according to competing roles and role expression might ebb and flow as they get access to power 
and lose it. Moreover, leaders might express different roles even if they do not believe in them in 
order to appease coalition members, opposition parties, and public opinion. In short, just because 
a national role conception is expressed does not mean it is sincerely promoted or believed in; it 
may be the result of a political struggle, a particularly tough electoral campaign, or a strategic 
expression of role for various purposes. It may also exist by virtue of one persistent political 
actor. An examination of the domestic political conflicts over roles would provide role theory the 
underlying mechanisms to account for the emergence of shared roles, the imposition of a 
dominant role, and the changes in roles and foreign policy when domestic political conditions 
change.  
  Research on contested roles can not only enhance role theory specifically, it can also 
contribute to theoretical development in FPA.  Although (as we have argued in this paper) a 
strength of FPA lies in its research on domestic political conflict, a focus on contested roles may 
give FPA a fresh way of conceptualizing policy disagreements. FPA (and International Relations 
more generally) has traditionally focused on interests-based preference orderings. Domestic 
political conflict over foreign policy, therefore, has been conceptualized largely in terms of 
preference disagreements. Rather than mapping role conflict directly onto how we understand 
preference conflict, FPA should take this as an opportunity to theorize what may be special or 
unique about role conflict. If roles are more identity- or culturally-based, for example, or if they 
are more intersubjectively-constructed than domestic political, conflict over roles may play out 
differently than domestic political conflict over preferences or policy options.  Roles may (like 
problem representations, as discussed before) proscribe preferences in a constrained way. Roles 
may also be less amenable to compromise and thus role conflict may be more likely to end in 
deadlock or with one side prevailing. If agents are more deeply invested in roles, role conflict 
may involve more manipulation, and information processing around role conflict may be more 
susceptible to framing effects, but less vulnerable to direct persuasion.  
              These are just speculative examples; the psychological and sociological literature that 
serves as Role Theory’s foundation should guide investigations of the differences between 
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preference conflict and role conflict. Taking seriously the special, essential characteristics of 
roles is one way FPA can heed calls to pay more attention to “ideas”. And according to Houghton 
(2007), the emphasis on individual ideas and decision making in FPA can be nicely 
complemented with constructivist notions of collective beliefs. Attention to role conflict allows 
FPA to engage the theoretical ground and ideational orientation of constructivism, while building 
on its past record of research on domestic political conflict over foreign policy.  
  Contested roles also provide a different way to think about the agent(s)-structure 
debate.  Some role theorists have argued that the study of NRCs can bridge the ubiquitous agent-
structure gap (Breuning 1995, 237; Elgstrom 2006, 14) because it incorporates the presence of 
institutional factors and purposive action. Breuning (1995, 237), for example, argues that 
international structure does not give decision-makers clear indications about what constitutes 
good foreign policy. Instead, leader perceptions enter into the equation.  Yet conflict over roles 
indicates that international structures clearly matter.  When domestic political actors invoke roles 
to justify their positions, they are tapping into the normative power of roles.  The impact of roles, 
however, is not uniformly felt across the country, but rather enters into and is shaped by the 
domestic political process.                
Despite some of this theoretical writing on the topic, the NRC literature is light on the 
agent-structure debate. FPA scholars have been struggling with this question for at least the last 
50 years, and a more serious engagement with this literature would be of benefit to role theory 
and to FPA. One thing is clear: role theory, especially when it deals with contested roles, could 
actually provide an “experimental design” setting in which the structure is held constant as 
scholars analyze how different elites and decision makers reach different conclusions about their 
country's role(s). Why is it, for example, that the war in Iraq (which created a series of 
expectations for state behavior) led to such acrimonious disagreement between the conservative 
Popular Party and the Socialists over Spain's participation?  This conflict was centered in part on 
whether Spain needed to perform the role of a close ally of the U.S. in the war on terror.  Clearly, 
the two parties (and corresponding parts of society) had different ideas about the country's role in 
the war on terror. In order to understand the origins of these competing roles, we would once 
again have to turn to the domestic political structure, which would show that the international 
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structure does not simply determine country roles. Domestic factors matter in this regard and can 
actually act as a filter that generates competing roles. The study of NRCs, combined with the 
study of domestic political factors, is another way in which to study the agent-structure issue 
because it permits scholars to keep structure constant and account for variations in role 
conceptions.  
 Research on the strategic use of roles could bring together these benefits of 
examining contested roles. Examples of the strategic use of roles are not hard to find. Indian 
leaders used the symbolism of great power status to justify India’s first nuclear test in 1998 
(Nizamani 2000). In 2006, Dutch proponents of sending troops to southern Afghanistan framed 
the decision in terms of the Netherlands' commitment to international obligations (Kaarbo 2009). 
Advocates of post-Cold War U.S. interventions (e.g., in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia) 
often justify such policies in terms of the U.S. role of “world leader.” In the Coalition of the 
Willing that joined the U.S. in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, leaders in countries like Romania 
justified their participation by saying that their countries needed to play the role of “reliable 
allies” to the United States (Cantir 2010).  In all of these cases, roles were used by domestic 
actors in their attempts to gain support for a policy.  
Attention to actors’ conscious use of national role conceptions to achieve particular 
policy, political, or personal goals is an especially fruitful area for future investigation, for a 
number of reasons. How agents respond to structure and employ roles vis-à-vis other agents 
highlights the fact that structures do not deterministically impose behaviors but rather become 
part of the domestic political “game”. It also allows for a fluid conceptualization of the agent-
structure “problem” since actors’ attempts to strategically use roles for various purposes may not 
always be successful.  In addition, investigations of strategic use of roles can provide the 
underlying mechanisms for how national role conceptions change, with resulting changes in 
foreign policy behavior. It is also consistent with the direction that research in FPA is moving in 
many areas. Studies on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy, for example, have 
recently focused on attempts by leaders at manipulation (e.g. Shapiro & Jacobs 2000; Foyle 
2004) and research on small group decision making has focused on framing and manipulation 
(Maoz 1990; Hoyt & Garrison 1997; Kaarbo & Beasley 1998). Adapting this research to the 
topic of “role manipulation” is another way to infuse research in FPA with an ideational 
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component.  
   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
If role theory is to further develop in the study of foreign policy, and if it can serve as a 
bridge between FPA and IR, past assumptions on the shared nature of national roles should be 
problematized.  Research in FPA on conflict over foreign policy between elites and masses and 
among decision-makers provides a foundation for the study of contested roles.  Specifically, 
studies on the influence of public opinion on foreign policy and leaders’ attempts at manipulation 
can inform future research on the production of national role conceptions.  Studies on how 
disagreements among policy makers are affected by political, institutional, bureaucratic, and 
psychological factors offer guidelines for research on role disagreement and its effects on foreign 
policy making and foreign policy behaviors. Although analyses of domestic conflict over foreign 
policy may not always reveal rifts over NRCs, foreign policy research and many examples 
suggest that consensus is not inevitable or as strong as role theorists typically assume. FPA offers 
the tools to investigate the presence of role consensus and conflict, and complements the NRC 
literature, making it more empirically and theoretically robust.  
In addition, national role conceptions say much about a country’s identity, its priorities 
and policies, and how it relates to other states.  “Reasonable” agents may disagree about what 
role(s) their countries should play and may have a political or psychological stake in promoting 
certain roles.  Attention to these contests can help us to better understand the meaning and impact 
of roles in international politics.  
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